The protection of women asylum seekers under the European Convention on Human Rights: unearthing the gendered roots of harm by Peroni, Lourdes
The protection of women asylum seekers under the 
European Convention on Human Rights: unearthing the 
gendered roots of harm
PERONI, Lourdes
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/21325/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
PERONI, Lourdes (2018). The protection of women asylum seekers under the 
European Convention on Human Rights: unearthing the gendered roots of harm. 
Human Rights Law Review, 18 (2), 347-370. 
Copyright and re-use policy
See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk
 1 
The Protection of Women Asylum Seekers under the ECHR:  
Unearthing the Gendered Roots of Harm 
 
Lourdes Peroni

 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
This article analyses women asylum seekers’ claims of gendered ill-treatment under 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It argues that the European 
Court of Human Rights moves away from creating equal conditions of protection for 
women asylum seekers every time it adopts two modes of reasoning: under-
scrutinizing the gendered roots of risk of ill-treatment and over-scrutinizing individual 
capacity to deal with the risk. The first mode of reasoning overlooks the social and 
institutional conditions that render women vulnerable to ill-treatment. The second 
mode over-emphasizes a woman’s ability to protect herself and/or male relatives’ 
capacity to protect her. The two modes suggest that women asylum seekers risk ill-
treatment because of personal failures/limits rather than socio-institutional 
failures/constraints. These modes of reasoning may oversimplify concrete risks and 
recreate women’s subordinate status in human rights discourse. To counter these 
faults, the article proposes to reappraise the risk of gendered ill-treatment structurally 
and relationally.  
 
KEYWORDS: asylum seekers, women, gender, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
non-refoulement, Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Though ‘not there yet’,1 over the past years refugee law has significantly developed to 
respond to women’s gender-related claims of persecution. While obstacles remain2 
and reform is ‘at best half-done’, gender issues have moved ‘from the margins to the 
centre’ of refugee law.3 International human rights law, too, has been sensitive to the 
plight of refugee women and women asylum seekers.
4
 The European Court of Human 
                                                        

 Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Human Rights Centre, Ghent University.  
1
 Foster, ‘Why We Are Not There Yet: The Particular Challenge of “Particular Social Group”’ in 
Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank (eds), Gender in Refugee Law: From the Margins to the Centre (2014) 
17.  
2
 See, for instance, Mullally, ‘Domestic Violence Asylum Claims and Recent Developments in 
International Human Rights Law: A Progress Narrative?’ (2011) 60 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 459. 
3
 Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank, ‘Introduction’ in Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank (eds), Gender in 
Refugee Law: From the Margins to the Centre (2014) 1 at 11. 
4
 See, for instance, Chapter VII ‘Migration and Asylum’, Council of Europe Convention on Preventing 
and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence 2011, CETS 210 (‘Istanbul 
Convention’) and Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (‘CEDAW 
Committee’), General Recommendation No 32: Gender-related Dimensions of Refugee Status, 
Asylum, Nationality and Statelessness of Women (2014). 
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Rights (‘the Court’ or ‘the Strasbourg Court’), however, may be lagging behind. The 
Court has recognized the seriousness of the harms women asylum seekers often 
escape from but has yet to take seriously the risk assessment of these harms.   
In this article, I analyse women asylum seekers’ claims of gendered ill-
treatment under the non-refoulement principle that the Court has read into Article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
5
 I argue that the Court moves 
away from creating equal conditions of protection for women asylum seekers every 
time it under-scrutinizes the gendered roots of the risk of ill-treatment and over-
scrutinizes the individual capacity to deal with the risk. The first mode of reasoning 
overlooks the social and institutional conditions that render women vulnerable to ill-
treatment. The second mode over-emphasizes a woman’s ability to protect herself 
and/or her male relatives’ capacity to protect her. These modes of reasoning suggest 
that women asylum seekers risk ill-treatment because of personal failures/limits rather 
than socio-institutional failures/constraints. The reasoning may oversimplify the 
individual risk, reduce a gender inequality problem to an idiosyncratic problem and 
recreate women’s subordinate status in human rights discourse.  
To counter these faults, I propose to reappraise the risk of gendered ill-
treatment structurally and relationally. Assessing the risk structurally implies 
unearthing the deep-rooted gendered conditions shaping this risk. Evaluating the risk 
relationally involves looking at the ways in which such conditions may affect a 
woman’s capacity to deal with the risk. Illuminating these arguments are insights 
from vulnerability theorist Martha Fineman, who argues for attention to the role of the 
state and society in reinforcing human vulnerability,
6
 and from feminist scholars 
pointing to the role of relationships in shaping individual autonomy.
7
 My arguments 
further draw on insights from the work of the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (‘CEDAW Committee’) and the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  
I start the discussion by mapping out Article 3 ECHR case law involving 
women asylum seekers allegedly fleeing a risk of gendered ill-treatment in their home 
states. I then zoom in on cases in which the Court thinly examines the gendered 
structures shaping this risk and thickly evaluates the private capacity to deal with the 
risk. I argue that these modes of assessment may encourage protective stereotypes of 
women long criticized by feminists in international human rights law.
8
 I finish by 
discussing cases in which the Court engages more substantively with the gendered 
structures underlying women’s alleged risk of ill-treatment.   
                                                        
5
 Article 3 ECHR reads: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.’ See, for instance, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece Application No 30696/09, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 21 January 2011 (Grand Chamber) at para 286.   
6
 Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008-2009) 20 
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1.  
7
 See, for instance, Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law 
(2012). 
8
 See, for instance, Otto, ‘Lost in Translation: Re-Scripting the Sexed Subjects of International Human 
Rights Law’ in Orford (ed), International Law and Its Others (2006) 318 and Kapur, ‘The Tragedy of 
Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in International/Postcolonial Feminist Legal 
Politics’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1.  
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2. ARTICLE 3 ECHR AND GENDERED ILL-TREATMENT OF WOMEN 
ASYLUM SEEKERS 
 
Under Article 3 ECHR, several women whose requests for asylum failed domestically 
have sought the Court’s protection against what they saw as arbitrary refoulement. 
Though the women’s claims surveyed for this article rely on various grounds, alone9 
or combined with others,
10
 the large majority of these claims (29 of 37)
11
 concern a 
risk of gendered ill-treatment.
12  
For present purposes, gendered ill-treatment is 
understood in three ways:
13
 (1) as forms of mistreatment typically inflicted on women 
(for example, rape)
14
 for reasons not related to gender (for instance, religious, ethnic 
reasons); (2) as mistreatment because of gender regardless of the form the 
mistreatment may take (women may experience ill-treatment because of gender when 
they do not conform to socially constructed norms of femininity and challenge 
women’s subordinate status in society);15 and (3) as forms of mistreatment usually 
experienced by women because of gender. As Heaven Crawley notes:  
 
A woman may be persecuted as a woman (eg raped) for reasons unrelated to 
gender (eg activity in a political party), not persecuted as a woman but still 
because of gender (eg flogged for refusing to wear a veil) and persecuted as and 
because she is a woman (eg female genital mutilation).
16
  
 
                                                        
9
 See, for instance, Rengifo Alvarez v The Netherlands Application No 14232/07, Admissibility, 6 
December 2011 (political) and N.M.Y. and Others v Sweden Application No 72686/10, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 27 June 2013 (religion). 
10
 See, for instance, S.S. and Others v Denmark Application No 54703/08, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 
20 January 2011 (political and ethnic).  
11
 The selected case law is the result of an Article 3 ECHR search in the HUDOC database using the 
following key words in English: ‘asylum’ and ‘women’ as well as ‘asylum’ and ‘woman’. The search 
included judgments and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights up until 30 June 2016 
involving women who had unsuccessfully claimed asylum at the domestic level in their own right, 
alone or together with family members. The following cases have been excluded from the data set: 
Dublin transfers, applications struck out of the list, joint applications when the alleged risk did not stem 
from women’s activities but primarily from co-applicants’ activities and applications decided by the 
now defunct European Commission of Human Rights. The inadmissibility decisions included in the 
data set comprise only those declaring applications manifestly ill-founded. The selected cases have 
been additionally identified through existing literature, the snowball method (some cases lead to others) 
and bi-weekly team discussions of the Court’s latest case law at the Human Rights Centre at Ghent 
University.  
12
 The gendered ill-treatment cases sometimes also involve other grounds. See, for instance, M.Y.H. 
and Others v Sweden Application No 50859/10, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 27 June 2013 (gender and 
religion).  
13
 These understandings are inspired by Crawley’s distinction in the context of refugee law between 
what she calls ‘gender-related persecution’ and ‘gender-specific persecution’. Crawley, Refugees and 
Gender: Law and Process (2001) at 7-8.  
14
 This does not mean that these harms are not inflicted on men. See Sivakumaran, ‘Male/Male Rape 
and the “Taint” of Homosexuality’ (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 1274.  
15
 Following Crawley, ‘gender’ is here understood as ‘the social construction of power relations 
between women and men, and the implications of these relations for women’s (and men’s) identity, 
status and roles’. Crawley, supra n 13 at 6-7. 
16
 Ibid. at 8.  
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While Strasbourg examples of the first
17
 and second scenarios
18
 described by Crawley 
appear uncommon, examples of the third scenario seem more frequent.
19
  
The Court has found an Article 3 ECHR violation in only three of the 29 
gendered ill-treatment cases. In one of them, the basis for finding a violation was 
primarily procedural.
20
 In the other two, the violation was based on a substantive 
assessment of the issues at stake.
21
 Of the remaining 26 claims seven have been 
decided on the merits.
22
 The rest have been found manifestly ill-founded and therefore 
declared inadmissible.
23
 Nine of the 26 unsuccessful applications have been rejected 
nearly exclusively on credibility grounds.
24
 These are usually instances where the 
Court finds applicants’ stories to be insufficiently detailed, inconsistencies 
unsatisfactorily explained and documents low in evidentiary value. The majority of 
                                                        
17
 See, for instance, Achmadov and Bagurova v Sweden Application No 34081/05, Admissibility, 10 
July 2007, at p. 3 (alleged rape in connection with religious activities).  
18
 An example could have been Jabari v Turkey Application No 40035/98, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 
11 July 2000. The woman’s sole claim concerned fears of stoning and flogging for alleged adultery in 
Iran. The case, however, has been excluded from the list of gendered ill-treatment cases discussed in 
this article because, according to information available in the judgment, Iranian adultery laws also 
applied to men. Ibid. at paras 31-32. Cases brought by Iranian women claiming a risk of cruel 
punishment for adultery together with other forms of ill-treatment such as domestic violence are 
examined in this article.  
19
 See, for instance, Ayegh v Sweden Application No 4701/05, Admissibility, 7 November 2006 and 
S.B. v Finland Application No 17200/11, Admissibility, 24 June 2014.  
20
 The domestic authorities had not interviewed the applicant and had failed to meaningfully examine 
her request for asylum. Ahmadpour v Turkey Application No 12717/08, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 15 
June 2010, at para 38.  
21
 N. v Sweden Application No 23505/09, Merits, 20 July 2010 and R.D. v France Application No 
34648/14, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 16 June 2016. 
22
 Samina v Sweden Application No 55463/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 20 October 2011; A.A. and 
Others v Sweden Application No 14499/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 28 June 2012; M.Y.H. and 
Others, supra n 12; A.A. and Others v Sweden Application No 34098/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 
24 July 2014; R.H. v Sweden Application No 4601/14, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 10 September 
2015; Sow v Belgium Application No 27081/13, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 19 January 2016 and 
R.B.A.B. and Others v the Netherlands Application No 7211/06, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 7 June 
2016.  
23
 Kaldik v Germany Application No 28526/05, Admissibility, 22 September 2005; Dejbakhsh and 
Mahmoud Zadeh v Sweden Application No 11682/04, Admissibility, 13 December 2005; Bello v 
Sweden Application No 32213/04, Admissibility, 17 January 2006; Ayegh, supra n 19; S.A. v the 
Netherlands Application No 3049/06, Admissibility, 12 December 2006; Collins and Akaziebie v 
Sweden Application No 23944/05, Admissibility, 8 March 2007; Achmadov and Bagurova, supra n 17; 
S.M. v Sweden Application No 47683/08, Admissibility, 10 February 2009; I.N. v Sweden Application 
No 1334/09, Admissibility, 15 September 2009; Izevbekhai and Others v Ireland Application No 
43408/08, Admissibility, 17 May 2011; Ameh and Others v the United Kingdom Application No 
4539/11, Admissibility, 30 August 2011; Omeredo v Austria Application No 8969/10, Admissibility, 
20 September 2011; H.N. and Others v Sweden Application No 50043/09, Admissibility, 24 January 
2012; R.W. and Others v Sweden Application No 35745/11, Admissibility, 10 April 2012; I.F.W. v 
Sweden Application No 68992/10, Admissibility, 9 October 2012; Muradi and Alieva v Sweden 
Application No 11243/13, Admissibility, 25 June 2013; F.N. v the United Kingdom Application No 
3202/09, Admissibility, 17 September 2013; S.B., supra n 19 and M.M.R. v the Netherlands 
Application No 64047/10, Admissibility, 24 May 2016. 
24
 Kaldik, supra n 23 at p. 9; Dejbakhsh and Mahmoud Zadeh, supra n 23 at p. 10; S.A., supra n 23 at p. 
6; Bello, supra n 23 at pp. 6-7; S.M., supra n 23 at p. 10; I.N., supra n 23 at paras 33-38; Samina, supra 
n 22, at paras 62-64; I.F.W., supra n 23 at pp. 4-5; and A.A. and Others (2014), supra n 22 at paras 61-
64 and para 68.  
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the 29 gendered ill-treatment cases involve alleged threats from non-state actors, 
including partners,
25
 family members
26
 and communities.
27
  
While acknowledging that gendered ill-treatment may affect asylum seekers of 
different genders,
28
 this article focuses on female asylum seekers. The focus is 
motivated by the salience and recurrence of these instances in Strasbourg case law as 
it currently stands. The focus on women is moreover driven by long-standing feminist 
concerns about women’s marginalization from mainstream interpretations in 
international human rights law.
29
 One of the well-known ways through which such 
marginalization has taken place is the public/private divide, including through the 
distinction between acts of state and non-state agents.
30
 This apparently neutral 
distinction reinforces gender inequality when linked to the reality that harms against 
women are often at the hands of non-state actors.
31
  
Historically, international human rights law and refugee law have been more 
concerned with harms typically suffered by men in the ‘public sphere’ than with 
harms generally experienced by women in the ‘private realm’.32 By now, however, it 
has been recognized under both international human rights law and refugee law that 
ill-treatment by non-state actors may amount to a human rights violation or to 
persecution. International human rights law recognizes that the state may be held 
responsible for offensive acts by private actors if it fails to act with ‘due diligence’ to 
prevent such acts or to investigate and punish them.
33
 Refugee law accepts that 
serious acts by non-state agents can be considered persecution ‘if such acts are 
knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or are unable, to 
offer effective protection’.34 
The Strasbourg Court has regarded several harms commonly inflicted on 
women by non-state actors as contrary to Article 3 ECHR. Think of serious domestic 
                                                        
25
 See, for instance, N., supra n 21.  
26
 See, for instance, Sow, supra n 22. 
27
 See, for instance, Omeredo, supra n 23. 
28
 Heterosexual men, too, may experience ill-treatment for flouting gender expectations and defying 
patriarchal power. See, for instance, D.N.M. v Sweden Application No 28379/11, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 27 June 2013. Asylum seekers’ claims based on sexual orientation and gender identity 
should also be viewed as gendered. See UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-
Related Persecution within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 7 May 2002, HCR/GIP/02/01, at para 16. An example of an 
Article 3 ECHR claim based on sexual orientation is M.E. v Sweden Application No 71398/12, Strike 
Out, 8 April 2015 (Grand Chamber).  
29
 See, for instance, Otto, ‘Introduction’ in Otto (ed), Gender Issues and Human Rights (2013). On the 
initial marginalization of women in international refugee law, see, for instance, Edwards, 
‘Transitioning Gender: Feminist Engagement with International Refugee Law and Policy 1950-2010’ 
(2010) 29 Refugee Survey Quarterly 21 at 22-3.  
30
 Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods in International Law’ (1999) 93 American Society of International 
Law 379 at 387-88.  
31
 Ibid. at 388. 
32
 See, for instance, Romany, ‘Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction 
in International Human Rights Law’ (1993) 6 Harvard Human Rights Journal 87 and Oxford, ‘Where 
Are the Women?’ in Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank (eds), Gender in Refugee Law: From the Margins 
to the Centre (2014) 157 at 160-1.  
33
 See, for instance, CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 19: ‘Violence Against 
Women’ (1992) at para 9.  
34
 UNHCR, supra n 28 at para 19.  
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violence,
35
 rape,
36
 and female circumcision (commonly known as ‘female genital 
mutilation’ or ‘FGM’ in international human rights law).37 Moreover, the Court has 
accepted that Article 3 ECHR may apply to prevent an expulsion where ill-treatment 
would come from persons ‘who are not public officials’.38 Applicants fearing harm at 
the hands of non-state actors must show that the risk is real and that the receiving 
state is ‘not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate protection’.39  State 
parties to the ECHR, however, may argue that applicants can relocate to a safe area 
within the home country and escape the risk.
40
  
Some of these are no doubt important ECHR efforts to attend to the kinds of 
harm frequently inflicted on women asylum seekers. Nevertheless, inattention to the 
gendered structures limiting the home state ability to protect women and conditioning 
women’s internal relocation may undermine these efforts. Gendered structures are 
here understood as the institutional and socio-cultural entrenched conditions that 
impact disproportionately or differently on women’s risk of ill-treatment. These 
conditions include impunity for harms usually caused to women and widespread 
discrimination against women.  
The next two parts of this article discuss two modes of reasoning that move 
away from creating equal conditions of protection for women asylum seekers in 
ECHR law: thin examination of gendered structures and thick evaluation of private 
capacity to deal with the risk. The former arises from a formalistic, cursory, vague or 
simply inexistent assessment of the home state ability to protect women and of the 
socio-cultural constraints women may face in relocating internally. The latter over-
emphasizes a woman’s ability to protect herself or male relatives’ capacity to protect 
her. The last part of this article looks at modes of reasoning that move towards 
creating equal conditions of protection for women asylum seekers. These forms of 
reasoning attend to the ways in which gendered structures may render women 
particularly vulnerable to ill-treatment.  
Before developing these arguments, a few caveats are necessary. Though large 
enough to carry out a meaningful examination, the selected case law is by no means 
comprehensive. Moreover, the analysis in the next parts leaves out the above-
mentioned case decided on the basis of a procedural assessment.
41
 It also excludes 
                                                        
35
 See, for instance, Opuz v Turkey Application No 33401/02, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 9 June 
2009, at para 161. 
36
 See, for instance, M.C. v Bulgaria Application No 39272/98, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 4 
December 2003. 
37
 See, for instance, Izevbekhai and Others, supra n 23 at para 73.  
38
 Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands Application No 1948/04, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 11 January 
2007, at para 137.  
39
 H.L.R. v France Application No 24573/94, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 29 April 1997 (Grand 
Chamber) at para 40.  
40
 See, for instance, S.A. v Sweden Application No 66523/10, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 27 June 
2013, at para 53. On the impact of internal relocation on women, albeit in another context, see Bennett, 
Relocation, Relocation: The Impact of Internal Relocation on Women Asylum Seekers (Asylum Aid, 
2008), available at: www.refworld.org/pdfid/4933cab72.pdf [last accessed 6 December 2016]. 
41
 Ahmadpour, supra n 20 at para. 38.  
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seven of the nine cases rejected exclusively on credibility grounds.
42
 The complexity 
of the issues raised in these latter cases requires separate attention exceeding the 
scope of this article. Two of the cases decided exclusively on credibility grounds are 
nonetheless discussed given their relevance to the issues here addressed.
43
 This leaves 
us with 19 cases decided on several grounds, including credibility, availability of 
appropriate home state protection and internal relocation.
44
 Unless relevant for the 
points made in this article, the Court’s credibility assessment in these remaining cases 
will not be discussed. 
 
3. THIN ASSESSMENT OF GENDERED STRUCTURES: OBSCURING 
STRUCTURAL AND PARTICULAR VULNERABILITY  
 
When the Strasbourg Court evaluates whether there is a ‘real risk’ of ill-treatment, it 
focuses on ‘the foreseeable consequences’ of sending the applicant to her home 
country.
45
 These consequences are established in view of ‘the general situation’ in this 
country, as described in reliable reports,
46
 and of the applicant’s ‘personal 
circumstances’. 47  The Court’s reasoning in the cases discussed in this part is 
characterized by a thin assessment of the general situation in the applicants’ home 
countries. In particular, the Court scrutinizes formalistically, cursorily or vaguely the 
home state ability to protect women (‘appropriate state protection’ or ‘state 
protection’) and the socio-cultural conditions affecting women’s possibility of 
relocating within the home country (‘internal relocation’). This part argues that this 
thin assessment obscures the ways in which state and societal structures may heighten 
female applicants’ vulnerability to ill-treatment.  
One way in which the Court formalistically assesses state protection consists 
of inquiring whether there are laws prohibiting a certain form of ill-treatment 
regardless of whether these laws are actually enforced. An example of this kind of 
thin assessment is Collins and Akaziebie v Sweden.
48
 Emily Collins and her daughter, 
Ashley Akaziebie, were allegedly escaping from female circumcision in Delta State, 
Nigeria.
49
 The Court declares their application manifestly ill-founded for various 
reasons,
50
 including that Delta and several other Nigerian states prohibited FGM by 
                                                        
42
 Kaldik, supra n 23; S.A., supra n 23; Bello, supra n 23; S.M., supra n 23; I.N., supra n 23; Samina, 
supra n 22 and A.A. and Others (2014), supra n 22. 
43
 Dejbakhsh and Mahmoud Zadeh and I.F.W., supra n 23.  
44
 Due to the limited space available, I am unable to examine all the 19 cases in full. 
45
 See, for instance, J.K. and Others v Sweden Application No 59166/12, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 
23 August 2016 (Grand Chamber) at para 86.   
46
 ‘As regards the general situation in a particular country, the Court has often attached importance to 
the information contained in recent reports from independent international human-rights-protection 
organisations such as Amnesty International, or governmental sources, including the US State 
Department.’ NA. v the United Kingdom Application No 25904/07, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 17 
July 2008, at para 119.  
47
 J.K. and Others, supra n 45 at para 86. 
48
 Collins and Akaziebie, supra n 23.  
49
 Ibid. at p. 10. 
50
 Other reasons included doubts about the veracity of the applicants’ story, Emily Collins’ capacity to 
protect her daughter and the decline of the FGM rate in the country as a whole. Ibid. at pp. 12-14. 
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law.
51
 Missing however from the Court’s assessment are reports on Nigeria showing 
that, once state FGM laws had been passed, local authorities still had to be convinced 
that these laws were applicable.
52
 A closer look at these reports would have alerted 
the Court that in some states, including Delta, the extent to which the police and other 
authorities had been enforcing the prohibition remained unclear.
53
   
A similar formalistic assessment of appropriate state protection can be found 
in RBAB and Others v the Netherlands.
54
 A woman and a man unsuccessfully claimed 
before the Court that their daughters would be circumcised if expelled to Sudan.
55
 The 
Court asserts that some provinces, including that of the applicants, had passed anti-
FGM laws to protect children.
56
 However, the Court does not look at country reports 
indicating that in practice there were no FGM prosecutions in Sudan.
57
 Nor does it 
take into account that, according to these reports, legal sanctions were ‘unlikely to be 
applied where a woman has been subjected by her family to FGM’.58 In another 
female circumcision case declared manifestly ill-founded, Izevbekhai and Others v 
Ireland, the Court notes that Nigeria has ratified the Maputo Protocol, prohibited 
inhuman treatment in the Constitution and passed state laws against FGM.
59
 Unlike in 
the two previous cases, the Court this time at least recognizes ‘the absence or low 
level of legal action’ to enforce existing laws.60 It acknowledges the mixed views on 
‘the potential for police support of women escaping FGM’.61 Yet the Court ultimately 
downplays these findings by stressing the federal government’s public opposition to 
FGM and the work of some Ministries against it.
62
   
What the cases discussed so far have in common is an over-emphasis on the 
home state formal efforts to end female circumcision when assessing state protection 
(for example, bans, ratification of human rights instruments, government 
opposition).
63
 A state may indeed be making its ‘best efforts’ to combat a specific 
                                                        
51
 Ibid. at p. 12. 
52
 Ibid. at p. 8. 
53
 Ibid. at p. 9.  
54
 R.B.A.B. and Others, supra n 22.  
55
 Ibid. at para 33. 
56
 Ibid. at para 55. 
57
 Ibid. at paras 25-26.  
58
 Ibid. at para 30. 
59
 Izevbekhai and Others, supra n 23 at para 74.  
60
 Ibid. at para 75.  
61
 Ibid. 
62
 Ibid.  
63
 See also Muradi and Alieva, supra n 23. An Azerbaijani woman claimed, inter alia, that, if returned 
to Azerbaijan, she would be forced into prostitution. Ibid. at para 5. The Court points to organizations 
in Baku providing shelters to women seeking protection. Ibid. at para 42. However, it remains silent 
about the serious deficiencies of these shelters. See ‘Wave Country Report 2011, Reality Check on 
European Services for Women and Children Survivors of Violence’, pp. 46-9, referred to in the 
judgment. Another example of the formalistic ‘best efforts’ approach to assessing state protection 
seems to be S.B., supra n 19. A Moroccan woman alleged, inter alia, that she was at risk of violence by 
her father. The Court notes that the Moroccan police had ‘a special unit for investigating domestic 
violence’ and that a ‘shelter system’ for women was in place. Ibid. at para 36. The existence of a police 
unit does not automatically mean that the police are in actual fact able to protect women from violence 
and the existence of shelters does not mean that they offer enough places for victims.  
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type of ill-treatment but these efforts signal willingness and not ability to protect.
64
 
Refugee law scholars convincingly reject determining the adequacy of protection 
based merely on state ‘serious efforts’.65 This approach, they note, ‘tends to favour 
form over substance’ since it overlooks the actual effect of such efforts.66  Thus, 
formally outlawing a certain form of gendered ill-treatment should not automatically 
mean that the state is in fact able to offer appropriate protection.
67
 Due to deep-rooted 
socio-cultural factors, change may extend ‘for years beyond the promulgation of 
laws’.68 As UNHCR notes: ‘Even though a particular State may have prohibited a 
persecutory practice (e.g. female genital mutilation), the State may nevertheless 
continue to condone or tolerate the practice, or may not be able to stop the practice 
effectively.’69 
Another way of formalistically examining state protection issues consists of 
inquiring whether the applicant turned to the authorities before leaving her country, 
without asking whether ‘that option was reasonable’.70  In Izevbekhai and Others, 
despite earlier doubts about the usefulness of police support, the Court reproaches the 
applicant for not having attempted ‘to report any issue concerning their daughters and 
FGM to the police’.71 According to the CEDAW Committee, the fact that a woman 
did not make a complaint to the authorities ‘should not prejudice her asylum claim’.72 
Authorities may tolerate violence against women; they may systematically fail to 
respond to women’s complaints; or women may simply not have confidence in the 
justice system.
73
 Only after significant changes in police practice and prosecutions 
may women start filing cases in larger numbers.
74
 An analysis of the home state 
ability to offer appropriate protection should thus move beyond inquiring whether 
protection is theoretically available. It should inquire whether there are any obstacles 
that may make protection virtually inaccessible to or unsafe for women.
75
 Attention to 
actual state protection is especially important when cases concern women, as access 
to protection is often gendered.
76
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The Court’s thin assessment may not only be formalistic. In RW and Others v 
Sweden, a case declared manifestly ill-founded, the assessment of appropriate state 
protection remains vague.
77
 In this case, a woman and her daughters failed to 
convince the Court that they would risk circumcision if deported to Kenya.
78
 Noting 
that the Kenyan authorities were taking ‘active measures’ to prevent FGM, the Court 
concludes that ‘there is no indication that the domestic authorities would be unwilling 
or unable to protect the applicant’.79 The reports included in the Court’s decision do 
however contain such an indication. They note that anti-FGM laws did not exist to 
protect adult women (like the applicant) but only women under eighteen (like her 
daughters).
80
 According to these reports, the Kenyan government’s willingness and 
ability to protect women against FGM was increasing but only slowly.
81
 Apart from 
legislation to protect minors against FGM – which had led to only a few 
prosecutions
82
 – the ‘active measures’ the government was taking ultimately remain 
unclear.   
The Court skips the assessment of appropriate state protection altogether in AA 
and Others v Sweden.
83
 The case involved claims by a woman and her five children 
(three daughters and two sons) allegedly escaping from a violent husband/father in 
Yemen.
84
 The oldest daughter additionally claimed that her father had married her off 
to an older man who had mistreated her.
85
 One of the youngest daughters feared a 
similar fate, as her father had allegedly attempted to marry her off to a man against 
her will.
86
 Though reports indicated that there were serious structural gendered 
deficits in state protection in Yemen,
87
 these deficits do not make it to the Court’s 
reasoning. This silence is remarkable because the Court does not rule out that AA and 
one of her daughters might have suffered spousal abuse.
88
 Nor does it doubt the 
father’s alleged plans to marry off another daughter.89 The Court finds nonetheless 
that that the documents in support of some of the female applicants’ claims were not 
authentic or sufficient
90
 and that these applicants would have a male network to count 
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on for protection upon return.
91
 Based on these and other reasons, it ultimately 
upholds the applicants’ deportation to Yemen.92 
Gendered structures may similarly remain thinly scrutinized in the evaluation 
of whether a woman can relocate to another part of her home country. Take the 
female circumcision case of Izevbekhai and Others, discussed above. In assessing 
whether internal relocation was an option for women escaping violence in Nigeria, the 
Court cursorily notes that ‘the federal Government provide direct protection to such 
women’.93 It does not acknowledge that the state protection structures facilitating 
women’s relocation remained weak, according to country reports. 94  The Court 
concentrates instead on the applicants’ ‘considerable familial and financial resources’ 
to conclude that they could have successfully relocated to the North of the country, 
where FGM was practiced rarely.
95
 In Omeredo v Austria, also concerning a Nigerian 
woman allegedly escaping female circumcision, the Court concludes that the 
applicant could successfully relocate to another part of the country even without 
family support.
96
 The reports on internal relocation for women in Nigeria do not even 
feature in the Court’s reasoning. These were the same reports as in Izevbekhai and 
Others.
97
 They indicated that government support to women fleeing FGM was 
progressing but remained weak
98
 and that women would need relatives able to 
accommodate them in the new location.
99
 Against this backdrop, it is difficult to 
understand how Ms Omeredo’s application meets an extreme form of rejection: 
manifestly ill-founded.
100
 
A thin assessment of the gendered conditions influencing women’s relocation 
is also present in MYH and Others v Sweden, a case involving a woman, a man and 
their daughter allegedly escaping religious persecution in Iraq.
101
 The female 
applicants additionally claimed that, as Christian women, they would be at risk of 
sexual violence.
102
 The Court concludes that the applicants could safely relocate to the 
Kurdistan region of Iraq.
103
 In the analysis of whether relocation was an option the 
religious dimension eclipses the gender aspect of the case. The Court extensively 
examines the situation of Christians in the Kurdistan region
104
 but devotes only one of 
the final paragraphs to the female applicants’ position as Christian women in the 
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country.
105
 In this one paragraph, the Court cursorily concludes that neither the 
applicants’ submissions nor the available country-of-origin information indicated that 
they would be at risk of gender-related ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
106
 
This conclusion, however, does not fully reflect the country information quoted 
earlier in the judgment. This information described sexual and gender-based violence 
as one of the specific concerns remaining in the Kurdistan region despite other 
improvements.
107
 
Cases like Izevbekhai, Omeredo and MYH illustrate that the Court may not 
consistently (thoroughly) check the criteria outlined in its own case law for an internal 
relocation to be acceptable under Article 3 ECHR.
108
 In relocating to another area, 
women may face cultural and social constraints to traveling, living alone and making 
a living there.
109
 They may have work experience but still not be able to secure a job 
if socio-cultural conditions severely constrain women’s access to work.110 Difficulties 
in securing accommodation or financial survival without family support may be part 
of the gendered reality in the place of relocation.
111
 For these reasons, the safety of the 
route, the availability of state protection and the socio-cultural context in the area of 
relocation should all be carefully examined.
112
  
In conclusion, assessing state protection and relocation conditions thinly 
obscures the societal and institutional structures that (re)produce female applicants’ 
vulnerability to ill-treatment. The thin assessment thus misses the ‘structural focus’ 
that scholars encouraging a more critical understanding of vulnerability have been 
arguing for.
113
 Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory pushes for considering the 
‘structural and institutional arrangements in assessing the state’s response to 
situations of vulnerability’.114 Society’s institutions, she argues, may not only fail to 
reduce individuals’ vulnerability; they may sometimes operate to exacerbate it.115 A 
thin assessment of these arrangements also overlooks what Fineman calls ‘particular’ 
vulnerability.
116
 Though she believes that all human beings are inherently vulnerable, 
she recognizes that they may experience vulnerability more or less acutely, depending 
on how they are situated within society and state institutions.
117
 In the cases examined 
in this part, the Court misses the heightened ways in which societal and institutional 
structures may render many women vulnerable to ill-treatment. In missing these 
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structures, the analysis may oversimplify a wider gender inequality problem
118
 and 
the risk that the individual applicant might face.
119
  
 
4. THICK ASSESSMENT OF PRIVATE COPING CAPACITY: THE 
IMPLICIT ‘VULNERABLE VICTIM’ APPROACH 
 
The thin examination of the gendered structures in the country of origin is in some 
cases coupled with a thick consideration of the private capacity to cope with the risk. 
In these instances, the Court over-emphasizes either the applicant’s assertiveness and 
resourcefulness to protect herself and/or the capacity of her male relatives to protect 
her. This part discusses some dangers inherent in over-scrutinizing applicants’ 
personal circumstances in this way while under-scrutinizing the institutional and 
socio-cultural structures influencing women’s relocation and the ability of the home 
state to protect them.  
 
A. Women’s Assertiveness and Resourcefulness120 
 
The Court’s assessment of women’s personal circumstances is in some instances 
characterized by an over-emphasis on their perceived strength, independence and 
resourcefulness to deal with the risk. Going to courts, making arrangements to leave 
the country and even applying for asylum may be taken as indications of women’s 
independence and strength to protect themselves or their children. Take, for example, 
the above-discussed case of AA v Sweden, brought by the Yemeni family escaping a 
violent husband/father. Without inquiring into the level of state protection available in 
Yemen, the Court turns directly to AA: 
 
[T]he first applicant has shown proof of independence by going to court in 
Yemen on several occasions to file for divorce from X and also shown strength 
by managing to obtain the necessary practical and financial means to leave 
Yemen.
121
  
 
The Court does not deny AA protection based solely on her perceived strength and 
independence. Her strength and independence are part of a set of factors that the 
Court takes into account, including credibility issues
122
 and, paradoxically, the 
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presence of male relatives to protect her.
123
 The Court seems to attach more decisive 
weight to the woman’s strength and independence in Collins and Akaziebie v Sweden. 
In this case, as noted above, the Court under-scrutinizes the structures undermining 
the home state ability to protect women who refuse to undergo circumcision. Ms 
Collins’ personal circumstances, on the other hand, are closely scrutinized: she was 
around thirty years old; had gone to school for twelve years; opposed her daughter’s 
circumcision and secured the father’s support; managed to obtain the necessary 
financial means to leave Nigeria; successfully travelled to Sweden; and applied for 
asylum.
124
 The Court concludes:  
 
Viewed in this light, it is difficult to see why, as indicated by the Government, 
the first applicant, having shown such a considerable amount of strength and 
independence, cannot protect the second applicant from being subjected to 
FGM, if not in Delta State, then at least in one of the other states in Nigeria 
where FGM is prohibited by law and/or less widespread than in Delta State
125
 
(emphasis added). 
 
Underlying these conclusions is the assumption that ‘if you can manage to get from 
Nigeria to Sweden, you can manage to protect your child from FGM’.126 As Eva 
Brems puts it in a critique of the Court’s reasoning in this case, ‘if a woman is strong 
enough to stand up against cultural oppression, she is too strong for outsider 
protection’.127 
Claiming rights in court or actively seeking international protection should not 
be held against women asylum seekers. Doing so implicitly punishes ‘rights-
conscious’ women, that is to say, women who identify their entitlements and assert 
their rights.
128
 This may discourage women from bringing gendered ill-treatment 
cases to the attention of the legal system, in this case, of a supranational human rights 
court. It may actually compound the gendered access problem discussed in the 
previous part. Taking ‘rights-consciousness’ as a sign of a lessened need of protection 
implicitly perpetuates the gender stereotype that the deserving female victim is 
unaware of her legal entitlements. Judicial stereotyping of this sort is problematic 
because, in distorting judges’ perception of who is a victim, it acts as a barrier to 
justice.
129
 A brief comparison of AA and Collins and Akaziebie with the Court’s 
reasoning in other Article 3 ECHR cases concerning female asylum seekers suggests 
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that women might be caught in a double bind. If they appear too diligent, they may be 
considered too strong and therefore less worthy of protection. If they appear too slow, 
they may not be considered genuinely fearful. Remaining in the home country for 
‘some months even after separating from her husband’130 or waiting ‘three weeks’131 
before applying for asylum have negatively affected some applicants’ credibility.132 
The Court’s analysis of applicants’ personal circumstances in other instances 
over-focuses on women’s resourcefulness, namely on their education, work 
experience and financial means.
133
 In Izevbekhai and Others, as previously discussed, 
the Court looks at the appropriate state protection only thinly while emphasizing that 
successful relocation depends most importantly on ‘favourable personal 
circumstances’.134 The Court points to Ms Izevbekhai’s family financial resources and 
to her ‘second and third level education and professional experience’. 135  It then 
puzzles over why the family, notwithstanding these considerable resources, had not 
attempted to relocate to Northern Nigeria where the FGM rate was lower.
136
 The 
applicant’s resourcefulness, though not the sole factor, plays an instrumental role in 
the Court’s conclusion that she and her husband could protect their daughters from 
FGM in Nigeria.
137
 In Omeredo, a case also discussed earlier, the Court acknowledges 
the difficulties that the applicant might face in relocating as ‘an unmarried woman 
without support of her family’.138 However, it concludes that ‘owing to her education 
and working experience as a seamstress’ the applicant would not need such support to 
rebuild her life in another part of the country.
139
 Ms Omeredo’s education and work 
experience play out decisively in the Court’s conclusion in favour of her relocation.  
Attention to individual resourcefulness as part of the assessment of applicants’ 
personal circumstances is not in itself problematic. Financial resources, education and 
work experience may indeed play a role in lessening one’s vulnerability to ill-
treatment. These are what Fineman, following Peadar Kirby, calls ‘physical’ and 
‘human’ assets.140 As she argues, these assets ‘affect material well-being’ and ‘bolster 
individuals’ resilience in the face of vulnerability’.141 What raises concerns, however, 
is the focus on individual resourcefulness without an equal attention to the broader 
socio-cultural and institutional structures conditioning women’s enjoyment of state 
protection and relocation. As seen in the previous part, a woman may have the best 
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education but still not be able to secure a job if she relocates to an area where 
widespread discrimination excludes women from job opportunities. A woman may be 
wealthy but still fail to secure protection if the police systematically see domestic 
violence as a private affair. In Izevbekhai and Others and in Omeredo, the Court 
seems blinded to the fact that women’s high education, financial resources or 
professional experience may not be not due to gender equality but despite 
inequality.
142
  
Hiding from view the gendered roots of ill-treatment while over-focusing on 
individual strength, independence and resourcefulness suggests that vulnerability to 
ill-treatment is ‘self-made’ and thus ‘ameliorable through individual self-
improvement’.143 The suggestion is that women risk ill-treatment because they lack 
independence, education, or financial resources and, therefore, can privately lessen 
the risk by improving personally, educationally and financially. Feminists have 
actually criticized how asylum adjudicators sometimes assess internal relocation 
‘from the perspective of the resources and opportunities available to the asylum 
applicant, rather than through the scrutiny of the actions of the State’.144 
Moreover, over-focusing on women’s strength, independence and 
resourcefulness runs the risk of reducing women’s vulnerability to ill-treatment to 
negative stereotypes.
145
 The assumption is that the deserving female victim is 
vulnerable to mistreatment because she is unassertive, dependent and uneducated. The 
Court does not explicitly describe her in these terms. In fact, it does not expressly call 
her vulnerable. Yet these assumptions underlie the Court’s reasoning in the cases 
discussed so far in this sub-section and are further confirmed in a case unexamined up 
until to now: Sow v Belgium. Sow was reportedly escaping a second genital 
circumcision in Guinea.
146
 The Court dismisses her claim for several reasons, 
including the fact that a twenty-eight-year-old woman who had a progressive 
education and opposed female circumcision cannot be considered ‘a particularly 
vulnerable young woman’ (emphasis added).147 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
refers to Collins and Akaziebie and Izevbekhai and Others.
148
 These are two of the 
cases where women’s strength and resourcefulness are implicitly taken as signals of a 
lessened need of protection. 
In leaving no room for the more nuanced and realistic coexistence of 
victimization and agency,
149
 this account of vulnerability may exclude from 
protection women who do not fit ‘ideal’ female victim behaviour (that is, unassertive, 
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dependent and passive).
150
 It may thus stack the odds against non-Western female 
applicants who resemble the stereotype of Western women as independent and 
educated or who are not ‘womanly enough’, according to stereotypes of non-Western 
women. As Sherene Razack puts it referring to women asylum seekers in Canada: ‘If 
the woman betrays too much personal strength, decision makers can assume that her 
story of being victimized does not ring true because she appears to be someone who 
can protect herself.’151 One of the clearest Strasbourg examples of how the applicant’s 
story did not ring true partly because she betrayed too much independence is IFW v 
Sweden.
152
 The case, declared manifestly ill-founded on credibility grounds, involved 
an Iraqi woman apparently fleeing violence from her male relatives for having 
dishonoured them as a result of a relationship with a man.
153
 Since she had run ‘her 
own business in Iraq’ and led ‘an independent life’, the Court finds it questionable 
that ‘her family has such a strong honour culture that an illegitimate relationship 
would lead to a risk of her being killed’.154  
The gender stereotypes flowing from the implicit ‘vulnerable victim’ approach 
resonate with essentialist constructions of non-Western women as passive victims, 
which postcolonial feminists
155
 have condemned in international human rights law.
156
 
As Dianne Otto has shown, one of the recurring female subjects in this body of 
international law has been the ‘victim subject’. 157  This female subject has been 
produced in contrast to the male subject whose dominance she sustains: ‘the 
masculine bearer of “civilization” who rescues “native” women from “barbarian” 
men’.158  Otto thus shows how stereotypes of women as helpless victims needing 
protection have gone hand in hand with stereotypes of men as ‘protectors, supporters 
and saviours’ and have served to recreate women’s inferiority to men in international 
law.
159
 As will now be discussed, in a few cases, the Court has implicitly recreated 
these gender stereotypes of men as well.  
 
B. Women’s Male Protection Network  
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In the majority of the cases discussed up until to now, the Court highlights women’s 
own capacity to deal with the risk either in the place where they come from or in other 
areas of their countries of origin. In the cases examined in this sub-section, the Court 
looks at the presence or absence of male relatives to protect women. In three of the 29 
cases surveyed in this article,
160
 the Court focuses on whether a ‘male protection 
network’ is available in the home country, probably prompted by arguments made by 
both the governments and the applicants.
161
 In examining two of these cases (the third 
one will be discussed in the last part), this sub-section argues that relying on a ‘male 
protection network’ is fraught with perils.  
One of these perils is under-estimating the degree of risk in cases where 
applicants do have male relatives in the home country. An illustration of this peril is 
paradoxically AA and Others, the case in which the Court also stresses the woman’s 
strength and independence to protect herself. In looking at the family support AA 
would have in Yemen, the Court turns primarily to her brother and to her adult 
sons.
162
 There is some evidentiary basis for the Court’s conclusion that the brother 
would support her.
163
 However, it is difficult to find a basis for the conclusion that the 
sons ‘would enable her to live away from her husband’.164 The Court reaches a similar 
conclusion with respect to one of A.A.’s daughters: ‘[She] would be accompanied by 
her two brothers, with whom she left Yemen and, thus, she would have a male 
network and be able to live away from her husband and father.’165 Rather than on 
evidence, the Court’s assertions seem to be based on the implicit gender stereotype 
that men are women’s protectors. The subtext is that the sons/brothers would protect 
the female family members merely by virtue of being men and adults.  
The danger of over-simplifying the risk is also exemplified by RH v 
Sweden.
166
 RH unsuccessfully claimed before the Court that, if returned to Somalia, 
she would be either forced to marry someone or killed by her uncles for refusing to 
marry against her will.
167
 She additionally alleged that she would risk being sexually 
assaulted given the severe conditions for Somali women who lacked male relatives.
168
 
Unlike in AA, the Court generously examines the structural state-protection and socio-
cultural conditions underlying violence against women in Somalia.
169
 Yet, in its 
conclusion of the country situation, the Court simplistically notes: ‘a single woman 
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returning to Mogadishu without access to protection from a male network would face 
a real risk of living in conditions’ contrary to Article 3 ECHR.170 It concludes that RH 
would not return to Mogadishu ‘as a lone woman with the risks that such a situation 
entails’, 171  as she had a brother and uncles and therefore a ‘male protection 
network’.172 The Court assumes that the male relatives would protect her without 
considering country reports indicating that family members were among the actors 
committing violence against women with impunity in Somalia.
173
  
Family support upon return to the home country may be an important 
consideration, especially where evidence shows that applicants would risk their lives 
or their physical integrity without such support. As a network of relationships from 
which people often get help, family may be a ‘social asset’ in the face of 
vulnerability.
174
 Examining the support male relatives may offer is therefore not in 
principle problematic. In fact, applicants may have only male relatives left in their 
countries of origin. In some cases, there might be evidence that such relatives have a 
close relationship with the applicant and are able to offer actual support.  
Yet, as many of the Strasbourg cases herein examined illustrate, the family 
may not necessarily be a nonthreatening space for women. It is therefore problematic 
to simply assume that the mere presence of male relatives automatically equals 
women’s protection. In AA and Others, there seem to be no factual indications that 
this will be the case of AA’s adult sons. In RH, there are some signs that this may not 
necessarily be the case of the applicant’s uncles. The danger therefore arises when the 
Court relies on assumptions or generalizations that equate maleness with capacity to 
protect. As argued above, reliance on these assumptions or generalizations may distort 
the risk assessment in the individual case: male relatives in actual fact may not be able 
to protect or may represent a threat themselves.  
Irrespective of the potentially negative implications for the particular case, 
relying on such assumptions raises more principled objections. The assumptions 
suggest that state protection can or should be substituted by (a patriarchal form of) 
private protection.
175
 The suggestion is difficult to reconcile with the Court’s own 
Article 3 ECHR principle requiring that the ‘the authorities of the receiving State are 
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not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate protection’ (emphasis added).176 
The ‘male protection network’ cases raise yet a more fundamental challenge, one of 
enduring resonance in international human rights law: how to recognize a gendered 
reality without reviving gender stereotypes and re-inscribing women’s subordinate 
status in the law.
177
 The Court falls into these traps when it frames the risk in terms of 
presence or absence of a ‘male protection network’. The framing gives the impression 
that the risk narrowly arises from the lack of a male protector rather than from societal 
attitudes hostile to the status of single women. The fact that women may need male 
company to lead their daily lives safely should actually point to these societal root 
causes. Moreover, the need for patriarchal private protection signals a state’s failure 
to protect.
178
 
In obscuring these societal and institutional factors, the ‘male protection 
network’ frame turns the capacity to protect and the need of protection into inherent 
attributes of men and women. It thus revives the stereotypes of (non-Western) women 
as needing protection and men as protectors that, as seen above, have tenaciously 
underpinned international (human rights) law.
179
 What is more, in associating the 
dominant side of the dichotomy (protector) with men and the subordinate side 
(protected) with women, the frame reproduces men’s authority and women’s 
dependency in human rights discourse. Feminists have challenged the gender 
hierarchies produced by this type of dichotomies in international human rights law for 
failing to recognize women as fully human.
180
 The notion of ‘male protector’ has been 
moreover criticized by refugee law scholars precisely for entrenching ‘perceptions of 
women as inferior, vulnerable on the basis of their sex, and unable to survive without 
male family members’.181   
To conclude this part, the ‘assertiveness/resourcefulness’ rationale and the 
‘male network’ rationale may at first sight evoke contradictory images of women. The 
former celebrates women’s independence to protect themselves. The latter 
emphasizes women’s dependency on male protection. A closer look, however, reveals 
that these rationales are ultimately part of the same troubling narrative. They 
implicitly sustain a ‘vulnerable victim’ approach according to which women suffer ill-
treatment because of their personal failures/limits rather than socio-cultural and 
institutional failures/constraints. The limits/failures problematically attributed to 
women, in turn, echo the stereotypes of (non-Western) women that feminists have 
combated in international human rights law for recreating gender hierarchies.  
 
5. VULNERABILITY IN CONTEXT: INTERWEAVING THE 
STRUCTURAL AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
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This part argues for assessing the risk of gendered ill-treatment structurally and 
relationally in order to counter the dangers identified in the previous parts. It 
discusses four cases in which the Court moves in that direction. In one of them, there 
are hints that the Court might have given a more substantive consideration to the kind 
of state protection available in the applicant’s home country. In the other three cases, 
there is express attention to the gendered structures that may (re)produce women’s 
vulnerability to ill-treatment. Except for one of the four cases,
182
 the Court stays clear 
of the ‘vulnerable victim’ approach.  
The Court’s reasoning in the first case discussed in this part does not inquire 
into the gendered roots of the alleged risk of ill-treatment. Yet it signals a less 
formalistic standard in assessing the level of state protection. In examining whether 
the home state authorities would protect the applicant in Ayegh v Sweden, the Court 
does not just look at whether ‘the battering of women is a criminal offence’ in Iran.183 
The Court also notes that the Iranian authorities examine such allegations.
184
 It is 
difficult to know whether the domestic authorities actually investigated women’s 
allegations, as there are no country reports available in the Court’s decision. The 
Court’s statement suggests nonetheless a concern that goes beyond formal questions 
such as whether a certain form of ill-treatment has been legally banned. Mahin Ayegh 
claimed, among other things, that she would risk violence from her husband who had 
accused her of leaving their home in Iran and being unfaithful to him in Sweden.
185
 
The Court declared her application manifestly ill-founded.
186
  
In the other three cases, the Court does pay attention to the gendered structures 
influencing the ill-treatment of women. These structures include serious institutional 
deficits in state protection (for example, impunity for violence against women) and 
harsh socio-cultural conditions (for instance, widespread discrimination against 
women). The Court acknowledges this sort of background conditions in RD v France, 
a case brought by a Guinean Muslim woman fearing violence by her father and 
brothers for having married a Christian man.
187
 In assessing the state protection in 
Guinea, the Court takes into consideration the available country reports.
188
 These 
reports highlight that violence and discrimination against women are among the most 
serious problems in the country and that few victims report violence due to 
perceptions of police ineffectiveness.
189
 The Court finds that the applicant’s 
deportation would violate Article 3 ECHR,
190
 partly because the Guinean authorities 
were not in a position to protect women in situations like that of the applicant.
191
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An illustration of a truly robust examination of the gendered structures 
underlying both the state inability to protect and the socio-cultural context is N v 
Sweden; the Court found a violation of Article 3 ECHR.
192
 N was an Afghan woman 
escaping reprisals from her ex husband, her own family and her society for having 
separated from her husband and started a relationship with a Swedish man.
193
 She 
further claimed that she would face inhuman treatment in Afghanistan given that her 
family had disowned her and therefore left her with ‘no social network or male 
protection’.194 Taking its cue from UNHCR reports, the Court recognizes the wider 
context of socio-cultural conditions for women in Afghanistan, which included 
violence and punishment for not conforming to gender roles.
195
 Against this backdrop, 
the Court notes that N may be perceived in her society as not conforming to such 
roles for having attempted to end her marriage and lived abroad.
196
 When assessing 
whether she would enjoy appropriate state protection in Afghanistan against possible 
violence from her husband, the Court emphasizes the kind of gendered structures 
overlooked in the cases examined in Part 3: Afghan authorities do not prosecute 
violence against women
197
 and many Afghan women do not even seek help for fear of 
police abuse or retaliation by perpetrators.
198
  
The focus on state protection deficits and societal constraints such as those 
present in RD and N brings into the assessment the gendered structures shaping the 
risk of ill-treatment. Bringing in the gendered structures does not only facilitate a 
fuller and more accurate evaluation of the individual risk. It also avoids reducing a 
gender inequality problem to an idiosyncratic problem, attributable to a woman’s 
personal failures/limitations. Structurally understood, then, the risk of ill-treatment is 
shaped by entrenched factors over which the applicant and many other women may 
not have control. Shedding light on the institutional and societal roots of ill-treatment 
further encourages thinking outside of the stereotypes that women are at risk because 
they lack education or male protection.
199 
 
In examining the scenario of N living alone if deported to Afghanistan, the 
Court denaturalizes the male-protector and female-protected stereotyped roles 
precisely by foregrounding the societal factors that construe these roles. Reproducing 
UNHCR’s statement, it does acknowledge that women lacking male company face 
serious limitations on their freedom of movement in Afghanistan.
200
 However, and 
again following UNHCR, the Court sheds light on the socially constructed character 
of the need for a ‘male tutor’: discrimination against women, social rejection of single 
women, social stigma attached to their status and social restrictions on women living 
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alone.
201
 Framed this way, the risk is more complexly understood as flowing from 
gendered societal structures and state protection failure rather than stereotypically 
from the lack of a male companion. The latter is just a gendered symptom of a wider 
gendered problem.  
Bringing to light structural issues sometimes may not be enough to circumvent 
the dangers discussed in the previous parts. Recognition of the gendered and other 
structures in a certain country may be thorough but ultimately not enter into the legal 
consideration of the applicant’s individual circumstances. The Court generously 
recognizes the gendered state protection and socio-cultural context in RH v Sweden, 
the case discussed in Part 4.
202
 Yet when the time comes to assess the risk of returning 
the applicant to Somalia as a single woman, the Court overlooks this context.
 
As seen 
earlier, the Court ends up framing the risk in simplistic terms: lack of male 
protection.
203
 It then narrowly assesses the risk by merely asking whether RH had 
male relatives in Somalia.
204
 The Court’s thick recognition of the severe conditions of 
vulnerability for women in the applicant’s home country ultimately remains 
theoretical.  
The key to avoid the shortfall illustrated by RH lies in examining the structural 
and the individual relationally. In an attempt to challenge the individualistic 
conception of the human self in liberal thinking
205
 and human rights discourse,
206
 
several feminists have called for understanding the self relationally. In essence, the 
argument is that individuals are not freestanding but embedded in a web of relations 
that may enhance or undermine their autonomy.
207
 These relations include not only 
intimate (for example, family) and structural relations (for example, informal gender 
norms); they also include relations with the state.
208
  
Relevant for present purposes is that these relational accounts of the self and 
autonomy look at the individual in her social context and pay attention to the role of 
this context in shaping individual autonomy. In particular, these accounts encourage 
investigating how structural relations and relations with the state affect the individual 
capacity in the face of vulnerability. A relational approach is therefore useful to avoid 
locating an applicant’s vulnerability solely either in the individual or in the structural. 
Her vulnerability to ill-treatment should be understood as arising from an interaction 
between the two. A relational assessment of the risk of ill-treatment would thus 
require evaluating the applicant’s capacity to deal with the risk in connection with the 
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socio-institutional forces enabling or disabling her capacity. The structures within 
which she makes choices may render her vulnerable to ill-treatment regardless of how 
strong and independent she may be.
209
 
In summary, in order to counter the dangers discussed in this article, the risk 
of ill-treatment should be assessed structurally and relationally. The former implies 
bringing under fuller scrutiny the gendered structures shaping this risk. The latter 
requires assessing how such structures may affect the applicant’s capacity to deal with 
the risk. This does not mean that the Court should find an Article 3 ECHR violation in 
all cases where state institutional structures are precarious and discrimination against 
women widespread. This simply means that the assessment of a ‘real risk’ should be 
guided by a thorough analysis of the full set of structural and individual factors.
210
  
The Court’s over-emphasis on certain aspects of applicants’ personal 
circumstances as well as its under-emphasis on structural issues might be motivated 
by floodgate concerns. So might be the Court’s narrowing of the category of single 
women at risk to those without a male protector.
211
 The Court may not want to 
encourage all single women, let alone all women, living in conditions of systemic 
gender-based violence and discrimination to come to the Council of Europe Member 
States. Yet a thin examination of these conditions is difficult to reconcile with the 
rigorous assessment of the risk that the absolute nature of the Article 3 ECHR 
prohibition demands.
212
 As Eva Brems argues, commenting on the Court’s decision in 
Collins and Akaziebie:  
 
The Court might be afraid to encourage the 3 Million [sic] girls and women who 
are annually at risk of FGM to flee to Europe. Yet you cannot blow hot and cold 
at the same time. If forcing someone to undergo FGM is a violation of article 3, 
the same rules should apply as in other cases of this type. Women claiming to 
flee FGM should get a fair assessment of the ‘real risk’ involved.213   
 
6. CONCLUSION  
 
In this article I have proposed rethinking the assessment of women asylum seekers’ 
claims of ill-treatment. In encouraging a contextualized assessment of the risk, I hope 
to have opened up the possibility of gendering Article 3 ECHR non-refoulement 
analysis.
214
 Careful attention to the de jure and de facto context in the country of 
origin encourages ‘seeing’ gender inequalities in state institutions and society and 
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assessing how these inequalities may condition a woman’s capacity to ensure state 
protection. Attention to context, moreover, escapes reinforcing stereotypical views of 
(non-Western) women as vulnerable victims who lack agency and depend on male 
protectors. Viewed in context, vulnerability to ill-treatment is institutionally and 
societally shaped and not an innate characteristic of certain groups. Crawley argues 
that, rather than as ‘victims of “private” male violence’, women should be viewed as 
holders of rights that may be ‘negated or undermined by patriarchal structures and 
institutions’.215 Only by digging into the depths of particular contexts, can ECHR law 
unearth and truly assess the gendered roots of abuses women flee from. 
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